A recent post by four-time league champion and four-time OL Manager of the Year Jeff Paulson on our league forum lays the blame for our disappointing 2021 season squarely at my feet. The issue, Paulson believes, is that I used my starting pitchers in relief to the detriment of our team. It isn't the first time this strategy has been called into question. Paulson makes several valid points in his post. Was this strategy really to blame for Salem's mysterious under-performance this year? Let's take a look.
First, let me explain the reasoning behind this strategy. When I looked at our roster during the preseason, and compared it to every other roster in the league, it became glaringly obvious that we held an advantage over the rest of the league due to our starting rotation. I wanted to find a way to maximize that advantage as much as possible. Using those pitchers in the most high-leveraged situations seemed like a good strategy, especially given the weakness of our bullpen -- and the dearth of quality relief pitching anywhere in the league. Using one of our aces in an 8-0 game is a waste of resources. Using an ace to protect a one-run lead seemed to be a better use of their limited usage.
On Opening Day, Strasburg (.630 opponents OPS), Scherzer (.625), Sonny Gray (.671), and Jon Gray (.720 in Coors Field) all sported an opponents OPS lower than every reliever on our roster aside from David Bednar (.659) and Taylor Guilbeau (.666). Bednar (6.57 ERA) was pounded so hard in Chapter One that we removed him as closer. We used Scherzer twice out of the bullpen that chapter, and Sonny Gray five times, resulting in three saves for Gray out of four opportunities. The strategy, it seemed, was working.
The wheels fell completely off the wagon from that point forward, both in terms of our strategy and our season. As the season progressed, I stubbornly stuck to my original strategy, even after adding several quality relievers in trade. The fact is that our starting pitchers were still better than our relievers -- even the new guys.
Here are the end results of our experiment:
Needless to say, this experiment was a collosal failure. But should it have been? Diamond Mind's documentation mentions nothing about the effectiveness of a starting pitcher used in relief. The only mention is this: "A player who was not used as a reliever in real life does not have a relief rating. If he is used in relief, he will have above-average durability in that role, since his arm is accustomed to long outings."
There is no mention anywhere in the Diamond Mind documentation or website about a starting pitcher's performance suffering from pitching in relief...and yet here we are. Either the game DOES, in fact, punish pitchers used in relief who have no relief durability rating OR we simply ran into some amazingly bad luck.
How bad was our luck this year? Here are a few examples:
- In a game against Highland, I brought Strasburg in to close out a 1-0 game in the ninth inning. He gave up a walk, and then two quick outs, before pinch hitter David Fletcher singled home the tying run.
- In a game against Ravenswood, we were leading 2-0 heading into the bottom of the eighth. We tried to let Bednar close it out, but he allowed three singles to the first three batters he faced. So I handed the ball once again to Strasburg to stop the bleeding. Instead, he gave up a two-run triple to pinch hitter Jose Peraza.
- We were on the verge of a come-from-behind win against our division rivals, Joplin, during the final chapter. We led by a score of 6-5 in the ninth. I handed the ball to Strasburg to close it out. Instead, he gave up back-to-back home runs to the only two batters he faced: the tying and walk-off-win runs of the game.
- In a Chapter Three game against Allentown, both Strasburg AND Scherzer blew the game in relief. We led 6-2 heading into the eighth inning when Sean Doolittle ran into trouble. To stop the bleeding, we turned to Scherzer, who served up a two-run double and an RBI single to tie the score. Then, in the 12th inning, Strasburg served up a three-run home run to Matt Olson with two outs. Game over.
- Sonny Gray was given a chance to save a game in Chapter One, in which we were leading 3-0 against South Loop. Once again, our bullpen (Aaron Bummer this time) ran into trouble, and once again, we asked one of our all-star starters to put out the fire. Instead, Gray coughed up a pair of singles and a sac fly to the #7 and #8 hitters in the Furies lineup. Bednar then served up a walk-off homer in extra innings.
- Gray was also asked to protect a 6-5 lead in the ninth inning of a game against Vegas. He struck out the first two batters he faced...and then allowed two singles and a walk-off double.
- We had used up most of our bullpen, including seldom-used Sam Tuivailala, by the time we brought Sonny Gray into the game to protect a 5-3 lead in the ninth inning. Instead, he served up a three-run triple (with two outs, of course) to pinch hitter Franklin Barreto.
- Jon Gray was asked to pitch a very crucial eighth inning against Joplin in Chapter Five. Tasked with protecting a 5-4 lead, Gray instead gave up a three-run bomb to Marcell Ozuna.
- We held a commanding 4-0 lead heading into the fifth inning against Los Altos when our bullpen slowly and methodically began to give it all away. The Undertakers managed to cut our lead to 6-5 heading into the eighth inning. Having once again exhausted our bullpen (Ohtani, Doolittle, Workman, and Bummer), we once again asked Jon Gray to get through the heart of the Los Altos lineup and get us out of the jam created by Workman and Bummer: no outs, two runners on. A walk, a single, a sac fly, and a three-run homer later, we were looking at yet another blown save and a crucial loss.
